Antitrust Issues in Health Care Reform by McDavid, Janet L.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 43 
Issue 4 Summer 1994: Symposium - Vital 
Issues in National Health Care Reform 
Article 4 
Antitrust Issues in Health Care Reform 
Janet L. McDavid 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Janet L. McDavid, Antitrust Issues in Health Care Reform, 43 DePaul L. Rev. 1045 (1994) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol43/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
ANTITRUST ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE REFORM
Janet L. McDavid*
INTRODUCTION
Health care has become an increasingly important part of the
American economy. In 1993, the United States spent $942.5 billion,
over 14 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, on health care.' Ex-
penditures for health care have grown much faster than the rate of
inflation, and the Department of Commerce predicts an increase of
12.5 percent in 1994.2 Although the United States spends record
amounts on health care, there are still an estimated thirty-seven mil-
lion people without any form of health insurance.' These problems
led President Clinton to include health care reform as a critical ele-
ment of his campaign platform.' It also led to the creation of the
White House Health Care Task Force, which has proposed legisla-
tion that will revolutionize the way health care is delivered and paid
for in the United States.
At this point, no one can know exactly what kind of health care
reform legislation Congress will enact. Legislators have introduced
many different bills, ranging from House Bill 1200, a single-payor
Canadian-type plan;6 to House Bill 3222, Congressman Jim
* Ms. McDavid is a partner at Hogan & Hartson, Washington D.C. She is a member of the
Council of the ABA Antitrust Section, co-Chair of its Task Force on Competition Policy, and a
member of the FTC Transition Team for the Clinton Administration. Margaret F. Costella of
Hogan & Hartson assisted in writing this article.
1. Robert Pear, $1 Trillion in Health Costs Is Predicted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1993, at A12.
The Department of Commerce expects health care expenditures to exceed $1 trillion in 1994. Id.
Furthermore, health spending will account for a record 15 percent of the nation's total output of
goods and services next year. Id.
2. id.
3. George Anders & Ron Winslow, Health Care Industry Is Now Restructuring; With It
Comes Pain, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1993, at Al.
4. Rallying Around Reform, 24 NAT. J. 2023, 2023 (1992).
5. The Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also Bonar
Menninger, Clinton Administration Has Started The Debate on U.S. Health Care; Pres. Bill
Clinton's Health Care Reform Proposal, Bus. J., Oct. 18, 1993, at 29 (describing the Clinton plan
as "revolutionary").
6. The American Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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Cooper's (D-Tenn.) bi-partisan plan;' to House Bill 3600, the Clin-
ton Administration's plan;8 to Senate Bill 1770, Senator John
Chafee's (R-R.I.) plan;9 to House Bill 3080, Congressman Robert
Michel's (R-Ill.) Republican plan. 10 Nonetheless, based on the simi-
larities between these proposals, it is possible to speculate about the
broad outlines of the final plan."
The Clinton Administration describes its proposal as "managed
competition."' 2 Similarly, both House Bill 3222 and Senate Bill
1770 are premised on the "managed competition" concept, necessa-
rily implying that these proposals include competition as part of
their core.' a The concept of competition in a free market protected
by vigorous antitrust enforcement is a cornerstone of the United
States's economy, and should be a cornerstone of health care reform
7. The Managed Competition Act of 1993, H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
8. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
9. The Health Equity and Access Reform Act of 1993, S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
10. The Affordable Health Care Now Act of 1993, H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
11. The various legislative proposals differ in many aspects. For example, the Clinton Adminis-
tration's bill mandates employer contributions to health insurance (H.R. 3600, § 1006(b)), while
House Bill 3222 (§§ 1001-07) and Senate Bill 1770 (§ 5003) rely on tax incentives as premium
subsidies. However, while these differences are important to the overall economic and social conse-
quences of the bills, they are not relevant to the antitrust issues raised by health care reform and
will not be discussed in this article.
12. Dana Priest, The Road to Health Care Reform, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1993, § Z, at 12
(stating that President Clinton embraced the managed competition model as a way to structure
the health care system).
13. Loretta McLaughlin, The Mixed Motives of Health Reform Foes, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
18, 1994, at 15 (stating that managed competition is the model for the three major plans, includ-
ing President Clinton's, Sen. Chafee's, and Rep. Cooper's). These three bills, however, are differ-
ent in the extent to which they rely on market-based reform or federal and state regulation. For
example, the Clinton Administration's bill takes a highly regulatory approach: it establishes a
national health care budget by imposing caps on health insurance premiums. H.R. 3600,
§ 1152(b). By 1999, increases in premiums would be limited to the same annual growth rate as
the Consumer Price Index. Id. § 6001 (a)(3)(A). Also, it establishes a National Health Board to
regulate the standard benefits package (id. § 1153), enforce the global budget (id. §§ 6011-12),
monitor increases in drug prices (id. §§ 1503(i), 1572), and standardize measurements of quality
(id. § 5003). The Administration's bill also calls for the establishment of Regional Health Alli-
ances (id. §§ 1321-29) that will employ an estimated 50,000 people. White House Expects 50,000
New Jobs in Health Alliances, INSIDE WHITE HOUSE, Oct. 28, 1993, at 3. It also establishes fee
schedules for fee-for-service plans. H.R. 3600, § 1322. The Clinton Administration's bill also al-
lows states to establish single-payor, Canadian-style systems. Id. §§ 1221-24. In contrast, House
Bill 3222 involves a less regulatory approach and relies more on market forces. Its proposed
Health Care Standards Commission would establish a standard benefits package, develop factors
for premium adjustments, and standardize information reporting requirements. H.R. 3222,
§§ 1301-13. House Bill 3222, however, does not include a global budget or premium caps. Id.
§ 1311; White House Sought to Dissuade Members from Supporting Cooper Bill, Sources Say,
Daily Rpt. for Execs. (BNA) No. 193, at G-3, G-6 (Oct. 7, 1993).
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as well.' 4 The overall goals of health care reform equity and effi-
ciency are completely consistent with the goals of antitrust laws. 15
Therefore, using the antitrust laws to protect against the exercise of
market power will be crucial to successful health care reform.
This Article begins by discussing the need for competition in any
health care reform initiative. Next, it outlines a likely reform plan
and discusses antitrust law and its application to health care reform.
The Article then explains the various antitrust exemptions that may
apply to different aspects of health care reform. Finally, the Article
concludes by reiterating the critical role that competition and anti-
trust must play in the reform process.
I. THE NEED FOR COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE REFORM
If managed competition is to succeed in cutting the costs of
health care, it must restore normal economic incentives to the provi-
sion of care. One of the reasons for the current failure of the United
States's health care system is that normal economic forces have
been distorted, and the incentives that influence the behavior of
health care providers and consumers are not set to enhance effi-
ciency.' 6 For example, although the buyer in most markets must
weigh the cost of a purchase, neither the health care consumer nor
the physician who prescribes a course of treatment pays the direct
price for purchasing decisions.' 7 The insurer typically bears these
costs and ultimately passes them back to consumers and employers
in the form of higher health insurance premiums. As a result, con-
sumers have had little incentive to control health care expenditures,
and providers have not competed on the basis of price.' A key ele-
14. See Mitchell D. Raup, Medicaid Boycotts by Health Care Providers: A Noerr-Pennington
Defense, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1393, 1414 (1984) (stating that antitrust laws seek to preserve the free
market in which prices are set by competition and the interplay of supply and demand).
15. Federal Agencies Set to Stay Course Pending Outcome of Health Care Reform, Daily
Rept. for Execs. (BNA) No. 97, at D-66 (May 21, 1993) (stating that a focus on traditional
antitrust objectives will promote the goals of health care reform).
16. Charles A. James, Remarks Before the National Health Lawyers Association 3 (Jan. 31,
1992) (transcript on file with author) (stating that the distorted incentive system discourages effi-
ciency and cost-containment while rewarding the over-utilization and over-provision of services).
17. Id. (noting that because of third-party payment, tax incentives, and subsidies, patients are
insulated from the true marginal costs of their health care purchasing decisions).
18. Id. The current hospital overcapacity problem exemplifies the need for the restoration of
normal economic principles. In response to patient demands, hospitals increased their capacity,
although insurers paid the cost. The result has been substantial excess hospital capacity. Approxi-
mately one-third of the hospital beds in the United States are empty each day. Saad J. Allawi &
Paul S. Levy, Rx for Health Care, VIEWPOINT, Winter 1993, at 59, 61.
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ment in any effort to cut health care costs, therefore, will be to
make both patients and providers more cost-sensitive.
Previous attempts to control health care costs have been unsuc-
cessful. Federal Medicare and Medicaid 9 programs attempted to
reduce costs by cutting reimbursements; providers, however, simply
shifted the unreimbursed costs to insured and private-pay patients."0
Insurance companies also tried to cut costs through utilization re-
views ("UR") designed to evaluate whether a course of treatment is
necessary and cost-effective. 21 However, while UR has had some
moderating effect, it has not changed the economic incentives rooted
in the current system.22
While these attempts have been unsuccessful, recent evidence
suggests that introducing competition into health care can restore
normal economic incentives and restrain the growth rate of health
care costs. A few states, such as Minnesota and California, have
implemented some form of managed competition, 3 while other
states, like Maryland and New Jersey, have attempted to control
costs through government regulation. 4 Over the past three years,
health care prices in states with competition have increased much
more slowly than prices in regulated states.25 For example, during
the period from 1990 to 1992, health care prices in Baltimore in-
creased more than 26 percent, while prices in Minneapolis increased
only 13 percent.26 Similarly, Calpers - the California state employ-
ees pension plan - recently introduced managed competition con-
19. Medicare is a program administered by the Social Security Administration, an agency of
the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988).
Medicaid is administered by individual states in accordance with a state-adopted plan that con-
forms to federal requirements. Id. § 1396.
20. Further Cuts in Medicare, Medicaid Would Increase Cost-Shifting, CBO Says, Daily
Rept. for Execs. (BNA), at 99 (May 25, 1993).
21. Managing Health Care, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV., November 1993, at 65 (explain-
ing that UR programs determine the appropriateness and necessity of health care and help deter-
mine where services should be provided).
22. Brian McCormick, New Self-Referral Scrutiny: In-Office Arrangements, AM. MED. NEWS,
Jan. 18, 1993, at 1 (stating that while utilization review can help guard against unnecessary care,
it would be foolish to think that economic motivations could be completely eliminated).
23. See Impact of Provider Rate Regulation of HMOs, PULSE (Sherlock Co., Gwynedd,
Penn.), Jan. 1993, at 3 (stating that San Francisco and the Twin Cities have high HMO penetra-
tion and describing both areas as being driven by managed care).
24. See id. (stating that Baltimore and Newark do not have very high HMO penetration, but
are highly regulated).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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cepts into the Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO")27 cover-
age it purchases for members." Its premium rates for the 1993-
1994 year increased only 1.5 percent from the rates in 1992-1993,
and HMOs offered Calpers an average 1.1 percent premium
reduction. 9
Antitrust enforcement 0 has already played a critical role in
health care by paving the way for the development of lower-cost
alternatives, such as HMOs. 1 Without several court cases that ex-
tended antitrust law's application to professional practices, 32 and the
efforts of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Depart-
ment of Justice's ("DOJ") Antitrust Division to eliminate anticom-
petitive actions,33 the health care reforms Congress is now consider-
ing would not be possible.3 4 Therefore, the role antitrust law has
played in the past will continue to be important to health care
reform.
II. HEALTH CARE REFORM
Most proponents of health care reform hope to structure the
27. An HMO is an organization which assumes a contractual responsibility to deliver or assure
the delivery of services to a defined population of enrolled persons in return for a fixed periodic
prepayment made by or on behalf of enrollees. Josephine Gittler, Hospital Cost Containment in
Iowa: A Guide for State Public Policymakers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1263, 1270 (1984).
28. See Alain Enthoven, Effective Cost Control in Comprehensive Health Care Reform: The
Jackson Hole Approach, VIEWPOINT, Winter 1993, at 47, 51 (stating that the Calpers plan pro-
vides the premier example of managed competition at work on a large scale).
29. Marilyn Chase & Carrie Dolan, Calpers Proves Insurance Costs Can Be Reduced, WALL
ST. J., Feb 10, 1994, at B I.
30. The primary federal antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988)), the
Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 12-14, 19-22, 27 (1988)), the Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C.
§§ 13-13(b), 21(a) (1988)), and the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58
(1988)). The primary agencies that enforce the antitrust laws are the Federal Trade Commission
and the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION WORKING
GROUP ON HEALTH CARE REFORM, ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF HEALTH CARE REFORM I n.2
(1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter ABA WORKING GROUP].
31. Caswell 0. Hobbs III et al., American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Report
of the Special Task Force on Competition Policy, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 977, 979, 982 (1993); see
also ABA WORKING GROUP, supra note 30, at 3-4 (describing how federal and state enforcement
agencies have looked to antitrust laws to ensure that markets are open to alternative forms of
health care delivery systems).
32. See infra notes 58-110 and accompanying text (discussing the application of antitrust law
to health care).
33. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text (describing various actions to eliminate an-
ticompetitive arrangements).
34. ABA WORKING GROUP, supra note 30, at 2-4 (noting that antitrust enforcement has
opened markets to new forms of health care and has paved the way for the more innovative
delivery systems contemplated by health care reform).
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health care system so as to restore competition on all levels. This
section outlines the likely elements that health care reform legisla-
tion will include. It then discusses how these elements will create
competition and thus enhance quality and efficiency in the provision
of health care.
A. Outline of Likely Reform
Health care reform premised on managed competition most likely
will include four essential elements: (1) competitive provider mar-
kets to stimulate productive efficiency and innovation in delivery;3 5
(2) competitive insurance markets to stimulate productive efficiency
and innovation in financing;3 6 (3) risk adjustment mechanisms to as-
sure equity and discourage competition by risk selection;37 and (4)
financial incentives for consumers to stimulate informed shopping
for insurance and medical care and to control utilization and costs.38
These elements would work in the following ways. Large purchas-
ing cooperatives - also called Health Alliances, Purchasing Alli-
ances, Regional Health Alliances, 9 or Health Plan Purchasing Co-
operatives 40 - will act as "power buyers" of health care services,
using economies of scale to assure that services are purchased at the
lowest possible price. 41 They would purchase health care for individ-
uals and small employers, while large employers would work outside
the Health Alliance.42 These Health Alliances will collect premiums
35. H.R. 3600, §§ 1321-22; H.R. 3222, § 2.
36. H.R. 3600, § 6004; H.R. 3222, § 2.
37. H.R. 3600, § 1541; H.R. 3222, § 1204. Today, many insurers control costs largely by re-
fusing to insure higher-risk patients. Health care reform, however, will minimize risk-based dis-
crimination. Tom Morgenthau et al., The Clinton Cure; Reinventing Health Care, NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 4, 1993, at 36.
38. H.R. 3600, §§ 1111-35; H.R. 3222, § 1104; id. §§ 1201-03. House Bill 3222 relies more
strongly on market forces to control co-payment levels and deductibles. See H.R. 3222, § 1307
(discussing the National Health Data System, which would prepare analyses of the performance
of Accountable Health Plans ("AHPs") and publish annual reports in order to encourage AHPs
to improve their delivery of care). However, the Clinton Administration's bill prescribes co-pay-
ment levels and deductibles, which provide fewer financial incentives for consumers to control
costs. H.R. 3600, §§ 1111-35.
39. H.R. 3600, §9 1321-29 (describing Regional Health Alliances and their powers).
40. H.R. 3222, § 1701(b)(3).
41. Summary of President Clinton's "Health Security Plan," Daily Rept. for Execs. (BNA)
No. 183, at D-94 (Sept. 23, 1993) (stating that Regional Health Alliances will benefit from econ-
omies of scale). This Article refers to these purchasing cooperatives by their most common term,
"Health Alliances."
42. The Clinton Administration's bill allows employers with 5,000 or more employees to estab-
lish "corporate alliances" and opt out of Regional Health Alliances. H.R. 3600, § 1591. Under
1050 [Vol. 43:1045
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and then purchase a basic package of health care benefits4 3 from
competing groups of providers." In addition, they will publish a
"scorecard" comparing the quality and price of the different provid-
ers' services, which will serve as the basis for purchasing decisions
by both consumers and providers."5
Health care providers, on the other hand, would come together as
integrated groups to provide a broad range of health care services,
and possibly financing as well.4 These groups, which are termed
Accountable Health Plans ("AHPs"), would manage all facets of
the delivery of health care services, including selection of and con-
tracting with providers, utilization review, quality assurance, and
claims processing."7 For example, an insurer may form an AHP by
contracting with one or more hospitals, physicians, or nonphysician
providers - such as physical therapists and psychologists - to pro-
vide a full range of health care services, claims processing, and ad-
ministrative services."' A consumer would deal principally with a
primary care physician, who would act as a gate-keeper in deciding
what type of care a patient needs. For example, the primary care
physician would decide whether to refer a patient to a specialist and
whether a patient needs hospitalization. The existence of these
groups and alliances creates a need for competition in the system in
order to comply with antitrust law.
B. Restoring Competition
The reformed system would attempt to restore traditional eco-
nomic incentives to health care. For example, it would penalize pa-
House Bill 3222, businesses with one hundred or more employees could opt out of the Health Plan
Purchasing Cooperative. H.R. 3222, § 1701(c). The Clinton Administration's bill establishes spe-
cial rules that would create disincentives for corporate alliances to opt out of regional alliances,
including: eliminating payroll caps on insurance premiums (H.R. 3600, § 1385); eliminating sub-
sidies for low wage employees (id. § 6131); and an additional payroll tax (id. § 7121).
43. The government is likely to mandate the provision of a basic package of health care bene-
fits. See Marlene Cimons, The Clinton Health Plan; Health Care Solutions: A Mixed Bag of
Opinions, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1993, at 45 (stating that President Clinton's plan promises a basic
package of health care benefits).
44. H.R. 3600, §§ 6121, 6131.
45. Id. § 5012.
46. See Kevin Fickensher & David Kindig, Elements of the American Health Security Act of
1993, PHYSICIAN ExEc., November 1993, at 4 (explaining that AHPs are expected to evolve from
insurance companies and existing health care organizations).
47. ABA WORKING GROUP, supra note 30, at 8.
48. See id. (stating that the formation of AHPs contemplates collaboration among health insur-
ers and providers).
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tients who choose care not recommended by a primary care physi-
cian, such as a visit to an orthopedic surgeon or cardiologist, or who
choose a specialist outside the panel participating in the AHP.4' In
those instances, the consumer would be required to pay a significant
portion of the specialist's fee. 50
In addition, most AHPs, including both physicians and hospitals,
would be paid on a capitated basis, meaning that the entire inte-
grated network would receive a per capita fee for each patient each
year to provide all health care required under the basic plan.51 As a
result, physicians and hospitals would be at risk if they did not pro-
vide efficient, cost-effective health care. Most bills contemplate of-
fering consumers different options, including HMOs, Preferred Pro-
vider Organizations ("PPOs"), point of service options, and fee-for-
service plans. 52 Premiums, deductibles, and co-payments would be
higher for plans that allow greater consumer choice of providers."3
Multiple AHPs would compete with each other to provide the
highest quality care at the lowest price. Consumers would have ac-
cess to comparative information about quality and outcomes,
thereby encouraging competition based on quality. Also, since con-
sumers will have a choice of which AHP to join, AHPs will have an
incentive to control costs by controlling both utilization and admin-
istrative costs. 5'4 The AHP would negotiate the lowest possible com-
petitive rates or fee schedules with physicians and hospitals.
Because each physician and hospital would want to participate in
one or more AHPs, this would lead to competition regarding the
terms on which they contract with the AHP. Also, if both payors
and providers are participants in the same AHP, they will have the
same incentive to offer excellent health care at the lowest possible
price, and utilization review and quality assurance will be directed
toward those goals." Today, in contrast, payors and providers have
49. See H.R. 3600, § 1134 (describing the cost-sharing schedule for in-network and out-of-
network items and services).
50. Id.; see also id. § 1402(0 (defining in-network and out-of-network items and services).
51. Fickensher & Kindig, supra note 46, at 4. Other AHPs would compensate physicians
through salaries or fee schedules. Id.
52. H.R. 3600, § 1322; H.R. 3222, § 1102.
53. See H.R. 3600, § 1131-34 (describing the various cost-sharing schedules each health plan
may offer).
54. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (describing how AHPs will manage the de-
livery and administration of health care).
55. Providers will evaluate practice patterns for specific procedures to choose the most cost-
effective way of achieving the best outcome for a patient. Alan Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Per-
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ANTITRUST ISSUES
opposing incentives. For example, hospitals and physicians want to
justify long patient stays with many services and procedures, while
payors want the shortest possible stay with the lowest possible level
of treatment.
Thus, there will be competition among health care providers for
participation in AHPs and competition among AHPs for contracts
to provide services to consumers. There also will be competition be-
tween multiple Health Alliances and between Health Alliances and
large employers. 6 Proponents of health care reform contemplate
more integration and collaboration in order to produce this competi-
tion and other efficiencies. However, such integration can also create
market power; for example, the power to raise prices to consumers. 57
Market power in the hands of providers, insurance companies, or
any other single force will minimize competition, reduce health care
choices, and increase the price of health care. Therefore, health care
reform and antitrust enforcement must work together to achieve an
efficient use of resources while minimizing the risk of creating mar-
ket power for Health Alliances, AHPs, payors, or providers. The
following section describes how this would occur.
III. ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO HEALTH CARE
Historically, antitrust law has promoted competition in health
care. This next section will briefly discuss the principles of antitrust
law and discuss their recent application to the health care industry.
A. The Law of Antitrust
The primary objective of antitrust law is to open the market to all
competitors so that they can compete on the basis of price, quality,
and service. 8 Its basic principle is "that the unrestrained interaction
spective on Health Care; Raise Quality By Lowering Costs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1994, at B7.
56. House Bill 3222 calls for Health Alliances with exclusive territories. H.R. 3222, § 1101.
However, because House Bill 3222 allows employers with as few as 100 employees to form a
corporate alliance (id. § 1701 (c)), competition between corporate alliances and the Health Alli-
ance may be possible. Senate Bill 1770 also establishes individual and small employer purchasing
groups (S. 1770, §§ 1141-45), as well as large employer plans (id. §§ 1201-07).
Under the Clinton Administration's plan, however, there can be only one Health Alliance in
each geographic area, and large corporations are discouraged from forming corporate alliances.
H.R. 3600, tit. 1, subtit. C, § 1202(b); see supra note 42 (discussing the disincentives that will
discourage corporate alliances from opting out of Regional Health Alliances). This would effec-
tively eliminate competition among multiple Health Alliances.
57. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
58. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources . . ... 5 Antitrust issues are analyzed according to either
the "rule of reason ' 60 or the per se standard.61
The rule of reason is a balancing test that considers all the facts
and circumstances concerning a restraint to determine whether it is
an "unreasonable" restraint on competition.62 Under this rule, the
court considers the condition and nature of the business before the
imposition of the challenged restraint, the nature of the restraint,
and its effects.6 3 The per se rule, on the other hand, is applied to
restraints that are so antithetical to the principle of competition that
they are "conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal ... *"64 These restraints are those that "always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output,"6 such as
horizontal price fixing,66 market division, 67 and group boycotts by
firms with market power.68 When the restraint is "essential if the
product is to be available at all,"69 however, the restraint is ana-
lyzed - as are other less pernicious horizontal restraints - under
the rule of reason. 0
B. Application to Health Care
For many years, physicians and other professionals assumed that
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (stating that the
rule of reason test considers all the relevant circumstances in determining whether the imposed
restraint merely regulates or suppresses competition).
61. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
62. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
63. Id.
64. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
65. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
66. E.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (applying the
per se rule to condemn horizontal price-fixing).
67. E.g., Palmer v. BRG, 498 U.S. 46, 48-49 (1990) (holding that a market allocation agree-
ment is a per se violation of the Sherman Act); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608
(1972) (holding that an agreement between competitors to divide a market is a per se violation of
the Sherman Act).
68. E.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 293 (1985) (holding that group boycotts by firms with market power merit per se invalida-
tion); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145 (1966) (holding that group
boycotts are a per se violation of the Sherman Act).
69. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101-03 (1984); see also Broadcast Music, 441
U.S. at 24 (1979) (holding that where collective action is necessary if a product is to be offered at
all, it should be evaluated under the rule of reason).
70. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-03; Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24.
1054 [Vol. 43:1045
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the antitrust laws did not apply to them. 71 Any existing doubts were
cast aside in 1975 when the Supreme Court held, in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar Ass'n,72 that the "learned professions" qualified
as "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act.7 3
Following that decision, the FTC and the DOJ's Antitrust Division
brought enforcement actions in an effort to eliminate anticompeti-
tive actions such as boycotts and thus prevent physicians and hospi-
tals from contracting with managed care plans like HMOs and
PPOs,7 ' efforts to exclude nonphysician health care providers from
hospitals or health insurance plans,7 5 and even garden-variety price-
fixing.76 The FTC and DOJ also challenged a few hospital mergers,
usually where they believed it was necessary to preserve competition
amongst multiple hospitals.77 In 1975, the FTC also began its
landmark case against the American Medical Association
("AMA"). 8 Since that time, antitrust enforcement has opened
health care markets to innovative methods of delivering health care
at lower prices, such as HMOs and PPOs,7 '9 and has provided mar-
ket access to nonphysician health care providers like psychologists8"
71. Clark C. Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional Re-
lationships, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1099 (stating that before active enforcement of the antitrust
laws against the provision of health care began in the 1970s, the prevalent thought among provid-
ers was that they were justified in insulating themselves from competitive pressures).
72. 421 U.S. 773, 793 (i975) (holding that a minimum-fee schedule published by the County
Bar Association violated § 1 of the Sherman Act).
73. Id. at 786-88.
74. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 530 (1943) (holding that the
AMA standards limiting physicians' ability to contract with alternative delivery systems are
illegal).
75. E.g., Medical Staff of Mem. Medical Ctr., 110 F.T.C. 541 (1988); Health Care Mgt.
Corp., 107 F.T.C. 285 (1985).
76. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 349 (1982) (holding that a
price-fixing scheme among physicians was per se illegal).
77. Health Care Industry Policies, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,150, at 20,755 (Sept. 15,
1993) (stating that the agencies have challenged only eight of two hundred hospital mergers in the
last five years); ABA WORKING GROUP, supra note 30, at 4 (stating that most hospital mergers
have not been challenged because it is believed that they are unlikely to create sufficient market
power to raise prices or exclude competition).
78. See American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979) (issuing an order in response to an
FTC complaint that required, among other things, a medical association to cease engaging in any
action that would restrict its members' solicitation of patients).
79. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 530 (1943). In American Medical
Ass'n, the AMA was convicted on criminal conspiracy charges of restraining an early HMO-type
organization from doing business by enacting a plan that made it "unethical" for physicians to
contract with certain types of alternative delivery systems. Id. at 530.
80. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 485-86 (4th Cir.
1980) (holding that a Blue Shield policy which provided payment for psychologists only if billed
through a physician violated § I of the Sherman Act).
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who often provide lower-cost services. Indeed, antitrust enforcement
enabled managed health care plans to gain a-toe-hold in the market,
making these innovative delivery options widely available.81
Antitrust enforcement in health care differs slightly from enforce-
ment in other contexts. For example, while certain practices - such
as horizontal price fixing by physicians" - are per se illegal re-
gardless of the professional context in which they arise,8" some
courts have been unwilling to apply the per se rule to other health
care activities.84 Courts instead have focused on several other key
areas.
Antitrust enforcement agencies have vigorously applied antitrust
laws to cases involving alleged price-fixing,85 limitations on the de-
velopment of new products, and restrictions on the practice of non-
physician providers or physicians who practice in HMOs or clinics.86
81. ABA WORKING GROUP, supra note 30, at 1-2.
82. E.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 349 (1982) (holding a
physician horizontal price-fixing scheme to be per se illegal).
83. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940) (stating that, as far as
price-fixing agreements are concerned, the Sherman Act is a uniform rule applicable to all indus-
tries alike).
84. See, e.g., Wright v. Southern Mono Hosp. Dist., 631 F. Supp. 1294 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (hold-
ing that the per se rule was not applicable to either a group boycott of a staff member or a clinical
privileges rule because of the court's lack of familiarity with regulation in the profession and
because both practices related to the "public service" facet of the profession); Pontius v. Chil-
dren's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that the refusal to refer patients to the
plaintiff was not a per se violation since the boycott was based on ethical reasons); McElhinney v.
Medical Protective Co., 549 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Ky. 1982) (holding that the per se rule did not
apply to a physician since the action had a de minimis impact on the competitive market); Medi-
cal Arts Pharmacy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 518 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Conn. 1981) (holding that
a payment and reimbursement plan was not per se illegal since it had no effect on competition);
Everhart v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp. & Training Sch. for Nurses, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,703, at 73,895 (D. Kan. 1982) (holding that the denial of hospital staff privileges was not a per
se illegal group boycott).
85. Antitrust laws prohibit conspiracy and collusion to keep costs artificially low or prices artifi-
cially high. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 349 (1982) (holding price-fixing in the health care context
to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act). Price-fixing among competitors defeats the very
purpose of competition by keeping prices to consumers artificially high. Id. at 344-49 (discussing
the effects of price-fixing).
86. See, e.g., Diran Seropian, M.D., 57 Fed. Reg. 44,748 (1992) (prohibiting a physician from
conspiring with a medical staff to prevent competition); Debes Corp., 57 Fed. Reg. 39,205 (1992)
(preventing a nursing home's boycott of certain nurse registries); Medical Staff of Broward Gen.
Medical Ctr. & Holy Cross Hosp., 56 Fed. Reg. 49,184 (1991) (prohibiting the medical staffs of
Florida hospitals from entering or attempting to enter into any agreement which would prevent or
restrict the offering or delivery of health care services by other providers); Medical Staff of Doc-
tors' Hosp, 110 F.T.C. 476 (1988) (banning the boycott of a hospital that was planning to open
an HMO); North Carolina Orthopedic Ass'n, 108 F.T.C. 116 (1986) (prohibiting the boycott of
podiatrists); State Volunteer Mut. Ins. Co., 102 F.T.C. 1232, 1236-37 (1983) (prohibiting an
insurance company from applying different underwriting criteria to physicians based on whether
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Also, the DOJ recently brought criminal price-fixing charges
against an association of Tucson dentists,87 and both the FTC and
the DOJ are currently investigating other possible price-fixing viola-
tions.88 Limits on advertising expenditures and content also have re-
cently been prohibited. 89 Thus, while antitrust law is generally ap-
plicable to health care, it is necessary to focus on specific aspects of
the health care industry in order to understand the role antitrust can
play in the reform process.
they were affiliated with nurse midwives); Forbes Health Sys. Medical Staff, 94 F.T.C. 1042,
1045 (1979) (banning the obstruction of hospital privileges for HMO physicians); Medical Serv.
Corp., 88 F.T.C. 906 (1976) (banning the denial of Blue Shield participation to HMO
physicians).
87. United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that dentists who
met to determine fees had engaged in price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act).
88. FTC v. Indiana Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457-65 (1986) (enjoining a conspiracy that
had resulted in a restraint on trade); United States v. Massachusetts Allergy Soc'y, Inc., 1992-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,846, at 68,006, 68,007-008 (D. Mass. 1992) (prohibiting fixed fees for
allergy services by an HMO or by individual physicians with a third-party payor); United States
v. Burgstiner, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 69,422, at 65,711, 65,712 (S.D. Ga. 1991) (prohibiting
the exchange of information concerning current or future medical fees for a period of ten years as
well as any agreement to fix, raise, or maintain medical fees).
The FTC and DOJ have also filed civil cases involving efforts to increase prices or prevent cost-
containment efforts. McLean County Chiropractic Ass'n, [Jan.-June 1994] Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1646, at 11 (Jan. 13, 1994) (barring thirteen competing chiropractors from
agreeing to set prices for patients and the terms of third-party payor contracts); Southeast Colo.
Pharmacal Ass'n, 57 Fed. Reg. 52,631 (1992) (prohibiting a boycott in order to participate in
reimbursement programs); Peterson Drug Co., N.Y., 57 Fed. Reg. 21,290 (1992) (prohibiting a
boycott in order to prevent cost containment); Southbank IPA, Inc., 57 Fed. Reg. 2913 (1992)
(prohibiting a physician from entering into any agreement with another physician to fix, stabilize,
or tamper with any fee or price or any physician services); Chain Pharmacy Ass'n, 56 Fed. Reg.
9,223 (1991) (prohibiting two pharmacy chains from entering into any agreement with other
pharmacies to withdraw from or to refuse to enter into any third-party payor prescription drug
participation agreements); Pharmaceutical Soc'y of Orange County, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,441 (1990)
(prohibiting, among other things, four pharmaceutical societies from organizing or entering into
any agreement among pharmacy firms to withdraw from or refuse to enter into a third-party
payor prescription drug plan); Michigan State Medical Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191 (1983) (prohibiting
a medical society from entering into agreements with its members to affect the amount, manner of
calculating, or terms of reimbursement for health care services).
The FTC recently charged manufacturers of infant formula with price-fixing by taking actions
intended to coordinate pricing decisions. FTC v. Abbott Labs., 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
69,996, at 68,832 (D.D.C. 1992); FTC v. Mead Johnson & Co., No. 92-1366 (D.D.C. June i,
1992) (complaint); FTC v. American Home Prods. Corp., No. 92-1365 (D.D.C. June 11, 1992)
(complaint).
89. See United States v. Hospital Ass'n of Greater Des Moines, Inc., 1993-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 70,160, at 69,733, 69,734 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (prohibiting a hospital association and its
members from limiting or regulating the types or amount of advertising done by area hospitals);
National Ass'n of Social Workers, 58 Fed. Reg. 17,441, 17,444 (1993) (prohibiting restrictions on
the solicitation of and participation in patient referral services and truthful advertising); Tarrant
County Medical Soc'y, 110 F.T.C. 119, 122 (1987) (prohibiting restrictions on the amount, size,
and duration of physicians' advertising).
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IV. ANTITRUST AS A TOOL To ANALYZE HEALTH CARE ISSUES
Using an antitrust framework to analyze possible health care
structures is useful since antitrust laws are centered around the in-
terests of consumers.9" Moreover, given the experience of antitrust
enforcement agencies in the health care market and the courts' def-
erence to health care professionals,91 antitrust enforcement will
likely assist in achieving the goals of health care reform. This sec-
tion analyzes the antitrust issues that health care reform presents by
discussing certain activities that have long been the subject of con-
siderable antitrust attention and analysis.
A. Monopsony
Large buying cooperatives, such as the proposed Health Alli-
ances, may present issues of monopsony.92 Monopsony, also known
as buyer power, involves purchasers who use their size, or market
power, to drive prices down. 93 This conduct may be unlawful under
90. See Janet D. Steiger, Address Before the National Health Lawyers Association Program on
Antitrust in the Healthcare Field 9 (February 19, 1993) (transcript on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Steiger Speech] (stating that "[v]igorous antitrust enforcement can help ensure that change
responds to market forces and thus reflects consumers' wants and needs").
91. See supra notes 82-84, infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (discussing cases that
exemplify how the courts have sparingly applied the per se rule in the health care context).
92. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (describing how the proposed Health Alli-
ances will act as "power-buyers" of health services).
93. Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Cooperative Buying, Monopsony Power, and Anti-
trust Policy, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 331, 331 (1992) (stating that "powerful buyers, whether acting
individually, as a monopsonist, or in collusion with other buyers are capable of causing the same
economic harm that the antitrust laws are designed to prevent").
Charges of monopsony in the health care area have been made against Blue Cross and Blue
Shield. Providers have argued unsuccessfully that the market power of these payors allows them to
demand noncompetitive prices from providers. E.g., Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d 1101, 1107 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that a policy
allowing an insurer to pay a provider more for a particular service than providers were accepting
from an HMO was not a violation of the Sherman Act); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749
F.2d 922, 927 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that a legitimate buyer is entitled to use its market power
to keep prices down); Westchester Radiological Assoc., P.C. v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of N.Y., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 708, 714 (S.D. N.Y. 1989) (holding that antitrust laws do not prevent
buyers from using market power to negotiate); National Benefit Adm'rs, Inc. v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,831, at 62,370, 62,372 (M.D. Ala.
1989) (finding that monopoly power could not be inferred from a health insurer's alleged coverage
of 37 percent of a state's population).
Several New Jersey hospitals recently challenged the formation of an integrated HMO network
by Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey, claiming that it had utilized its market power to
secure low prices from hospitals, had boycotted some hospitals, encouraged physicians to boycott
hospitals, and fixed prices. Beth Israel Hospital v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc., Civil
Action No. 93-2952 (D.N.J. July 7, 1993) (complaint).
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section five of the Federal Trade Commission di fr /Act, 9" and sec-
tion two of the Sherman Antitrust Act,95 which prohibit monopoli-
zation, conspiracies to monopolize, and attempted monopolization. 6
The mere pooling of buying power, however, is not per se illegal
under antitrust laws.97 Most purchasing groups are structured as le-
gitimate joint ventures and thereby produce integrative efficien-
cies. 8 As the Supreme Court recognized in Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,99 group
purchasing arrangements "are not a form of concerted activity char-
acteristically likely to result in predominantly anticompetitive ef-
fects. Rather, such cooperative arrangements would seem to be
'designed to increase economic efficiency and render markets more,
rather than less, competitive.' "100
In Northwest Stationers, the Supreme Court refused to apply the
per se rule to the expulsion of a member from a purchasing coopera-
tive of stationery retailers. 101 According to the Court, "Unless the
cooperative possesses market power or exclusive access to an ele-
ment essential to effective competition, the conclusion that expulsion
is virtually always likely to have an anticompetitive effect is not
warranted. Absent such a showing . . . , courts should apply a rule-
of-reason analysis."' 02 Thus, group purchasing arrangements are an-
alyzed under the rule of reason rather than the per se rule. 0 3 The
recent DOJ/FTC joint Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in
the Health Care Area create "safe harbors" for group purchasing
94. 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1988)
95. Id. § 2.
96. Id.
97. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
297 (1985).
98. Charles F. Rule, Remarks at the "Antitrust and Health Care" Seminar of the Antitrust
Section of the Connecticut Bar Ass'n and the Connecticut Health Lawyers Ass'n 12-13 (March
11, 1988) (transcript on file with author); see also Mark J. Horoschak, Remarks Before the
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law 1-5 (August 11, 1992) (transcript on file with
author) (discussing joint ventures in the health care context).
99. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
100. Id. at 295 (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1,
20 (1979)).
101. Id. at 297.
102. Id. at 296-97 (citations omitted); see also NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98-
104 (1984) (holding that the application of the per se rule was inappropriate where horizontal
restraints were necessary in the industry); Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-20 (holding that the
per se rule was inapplicable to blanket licenses).
103. Northwest Stationers, 472 U.S. at 296-97.
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arrangements that meet certain criteria.0 4
If large buyer cooperatives such as Health Alliances are created
as part of health care reform, they will try to obtain the best service
at the lowest price. The risk in forming any large joint purchasing
arrangement, including Health Alliances, however, is the potential
misuse of monopsony power - such organizations may demand un-
reasonably low prices from providers that would eventually restrict
output and harm consumers.10 5 One good way to avoid an exercise
of monopsony power by Health Alliances is to ensure that they are
subject to the antitrust laws.
The Clinton Administration's plan poses a substantial risk of mo-
nopsony power because it allows only one Health Alliance in each
geographic area and discourages the formation of corporate alli-
ances.106 Hospitals, physicians, and other providers will be forced to
contract with the Health Alliance regardless of the terms and prices
it offers.10 7 The Clinton Administration's plan attempts to counter
the market power of the Health Alliance by allowing providers to
negotiate collectively with the Health Alliance to establish fee
schedules.'0 8 The bill requires the Health Alliance to establish a fee
schedule for fee-for-service plans, and it establishes an antitrust ex-
emption for such collective fee negotiations by physicians and hospi-
tals that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws.' 09 House Bill
104. Health Care Industry Policies, supra note 77, at 20,755, 20,759-60. Joint purchasing ar-
rangements are in a "safe harbor" if the members collectively account for less than 35 percent of
purchases in the market and the cost of the input represents less than 20 percent of the price of
the final product offered for sale by the purchasers. Id. The Justice Department had previously
applied this standard in a series of business review letters. See, e.g., Letter from Michael Boudin,
Acting Assistant General, to Benjamin Seligman, Seligman & Seligman 3 (July 7, 1988) (stating
in a business review letter that the DOJ would not challenge a proposal by FRA Shipper's Associ-
ation since its membership had a total projected volume of less than 35 percent of available trans-
portation capacity and its transportation costs represented no more than 20 percent of the landed
cost of goods its members intended to ship) (on file with author).
105. A few cases have found that joint purchasing arrangements exercised monopsony power in
violation of the Sherman Act. E.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons, 340 U.S.
211, 213 (1951) (holding that distillers who had conspired to fix maximum prices above which
wholesalers could not resell violated the Sherman Act); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 222-23 (1948) (holding that a purchasing arrangement
between refiners who constituted the entire market violated the Sherman Act).
106. H.R. 3600, § 1202. Monopsony power is unlikely to occur if there are multiple competing
Health Alliances. Jonathan M. Jacobson & Gary J. Dorman, Joint Purchasing, Monopsony and
Antitrust, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 4 (1991).
107. See H.R. 3600, § 1406 (describing the role of providers in the Clinton Administration's
bill).
108. Id. § 1322(c)(2).
109. Id. § 1322(c). The proposed antitrust exemption in House Bill 3600 did not appear in the
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3222 is preferable because it allows some competition between the
Health Alliance and corporate alliances.11 An even better approach
would be a bill that permits the formation of multiple Health Alli-
ances in a state or geographic area that could compete for contracts
with AHPs. This would provide multiple contract opportunities for
physicians, hospitals, and other providers, and obviate the need for
the antitrust exemption proposed by the Clinton Administration.
B. Issues Raised By Integration
Under health care reform it is likely that there will be various
kinds of integration among providers, and between providers and
payors. It is also likely that there will be horizontal integration of
competing or potentially competing physicians into groups, as well
as integration among competing hospitals. There are also likely to
be vertical integrations of hospitals, physicians, and nonphysician
providers into provider networks offering a full array of health care
services to consumers. Finally, there may be vertical integration
among providers and payors who provide financing, claims process-
ing, and other administrative services. Each of these types of inte-
gration raises possible antitrust issues, and each is discussed in this
section.
1. Cooperative Agreements and Integration Among Competitors
Providers - both hospitals and practitioners - may integrate
through mergers, joint ventures, or other contracting arrange-
ments."1 Horizontal integration and cooperative agreements among
competitors result in fewer competitors in the market.1 2 Such ar-
rangements, therefore, are an archetype for antitrust concern. Anti-
outline of the Clinton Administration's plan on September 7, 1993. It was added at the last min-
ute in response to pressure from the AMA. Anne Bingaman, the Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the DOJ Antitrust Division, has defended the proposed exemption on the ground that it
allows providers to band together to counteract the market power of the Health Alliance. W. John
Moore, Rough Ride, 25 NATIONAL J. 2874, 2879 (1993).
110. See supra note 56 (describing how House Bill 3222 allows for competition between corpo-
rate alliances and the Health Alliance).
111. Health Care Reform: Do Antitrust Laws Discourage Cost Cutters or Defeat Price Goug-
ers?: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 23-32 (1993) (hereinafter Hearings] (prepared
statement of Janet D. Steiger, FTC Chairman) (discussing possible exemptions for health care
mergers, joint ventures, and other forms of concerted action).
112. See Horoschak, supra note 98, at 24 (describing how integration may lead to market
power distribution in only one or a few competitors).
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trust and economic principles hold that when competitors integrate,
it often leads to a more efficient use of resources and creates new
innovative and cost-effective products."' At the same time, horizon-
tal integration can concentrate market power in one or several com-
petitors, enabling the newly integrated group to dominate the mar-
ket, drive up prices, and eliminate choices.""
2. Legitimate Venture or Sham
In some cases, a joint venture is used to disguise a collusive hori-
zontal agreement among competitors." 8 As a result, one critical
step in evaluating the legitimacy of an agreement among competi-
tors is to determine whether the venture is a "sham" or legitimate.
The first step in this analysis is to assess whether the venture is
provider-controlled. For example, in Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society,"' the Supreme Court found that two medical
foundations, established by the local medical society for the purpose
of "promoting fee-for-service medicine and [providing] the commu-
nity with a competitive alternative to existing health insurance
plans," were sham joint ventures that actually involved an illegal
horizontal price-fixing agreement." A provider-controlled plan,
however, is not necessarily illegal. " 8 As with all forms of exclusion-
ary conduct, the conduct must produce unreasonable anticompeti-
tive effects to be unlawful." 9 However, once a venture or entity is
determined to be provider-controlled, there is a greater risk that it
will be subject to scrutiny under the per se rule. 20 The Supreme
Court did exactly that in Maricopa, holding that the maximum fee
schedules established by the foundations were per se illegal. 2'
When considering the control of a health care plan, courts look at
113. Hearings, supra note 111, at 23-26 (prepared statement of Janet D. Steiger, FTC Chair-
man); see also Horoschak, supra note 98, at 16-17 (discussing how many hospital joint ventures
enhance efficiency and promote competition).
114. See Horoschak, supra note 98, at 24 (describing how a joint venture may have the ability
to raise prices by concentrating market power in one or several competitors).
115. Id. at 7, 13-14.
116. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
117. Id. at 336.
118. Id. (stating that in order to determine illegality under the Sherman Act, the actual pur-
pose and effects of an agreement must be analyzed at a full trial).
119. Rule, supra note 98, at 6-7.
120. Horoschak, supra note 98, at 12-13 (discussing how inherently suspect agreements, absent
a valid efficiency justification, are summarily condemned).
121. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 357.
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the substance of the venture rather than its form.122 The inquiry is
whether providers "sharing substantially similar economic interests
collectively exercised control of a plan under whose auspices they
have reached agreements which work to the detriment of
competitors."' 123
Another issue evaluated in an analysis of a venture's legitimacy is
the existence of integrative efficiencies.124 Either or both of the fol-
lowing factors can indicate the existence of integrative efficiencies:
the pooling of the participants' resources and the sharing of the risks
associated with the joint activity; 25 or whether the venture leads to
the creation of a new product.'2 Thus, joint ventures involving some
potential efficiency-creating integration of the participants' re-
122. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists, 624 F.2d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1980).
123. Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
prepaid health care plan comprised of between 90 to 93 percent of all eligible physicians and
osteopaths was provider-controlled because a majority of the plan's governing board of trustees
were physicians).
Courts consider several factors when evaluating whether a plan is provider-controlled. The key
factor, however, is the composition of the venture's board of directors and other decision-making
committees. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 594 (1st Cir. 1993)
(finding that although the board of U.S. Healthcare was dominated by physicians, there was evi-
dence indicating that the board played no role in the development of the exclusionary provision at
issue); Barry v. Blue Cross of Cal., 805 F.2d 866, 868-69 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that a physi-
cians relations committee, consisting of sixteen doctors, that offered comments and suggestions
before the plan was implemented did not establish physician control of organization); Pennsylva-
nia Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248, 256 (3rd Cir. 1984) (holding that the fact
that dentists constituted the majority of two committees of directors did not establish a prima
facie case of price-fixing); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624
F.2d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding that a Blue Shield plan was within the purview of the
Sherman Act because its bylaws required a majority of the board of directors to be physicians);
Michigan State Podiatry Ass'n v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 671 F. Supp. 1139, 1146
(E.D. Mich. 1987) (stating that a conspiracy may be found to exist when corporate directors,
officers, or representatives are working on behalf of two or more entities); Human Resources Inst.
of Norfolk, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Va., 498 F. Supp. 63, 66 (E.D. Va. 1980) (stating that although
a subscriber majority on a board of directors did not preclude a finding of control by member
hospitals, there was not any direct evidence of member hospital control).
124. See Rule, supra note 98, at 6-7 (discussing how economic efficiencies are considered in the
analysis of effect on competition).
125. Maricbpa, 457 U.S. at 356-57 (1982). In Maricopa, the Supreme Court found a venture
among competing physicians to be a naked price-fixing cartel and, therefore, per se illegal. Id. The
Court based this conclusion on the absence of any integrative efficiencies. Id. The Court also noted
that partnerships - or other joint arrangements in which persons who would otherwise be com-
petitors pool their capital and share the risks of loss as well as the opportunities for profit - will
be regarded as a single firm competing with other sellers in the market. Id.
126. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984) (holding that a television plan
was not a new product); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1,
20-23 (1979) (analyzing a blanket license covering broadcast rights as a new product); SCFC
ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 956, 973 (D. Utah 1993) (stating that if firms know
they may be forced to share new products, they will be less likely to develop new products).
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sources qualify for analysis under the rule of reason. 27
3. Mergers
If hospitals or physicians were to fully integrate, the merger
would be subject to section seven of the Clayton Act. 28 Federal an-
titrust enforcement agencies would then apply the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines2 1 to define the markets involved, determine the
resultant post-merger concentration, and evaluate the competitive
effects of the transaction.3 0 If the concentration is sufficiently high,
antitrust enforcement agencies would then undertake more fact-spe-
cific studies to balance the actual effect the merger may have on the
market against the efficiencies that may be created.' 3 ' The agencies
would also consider forces that could constrain the merged entity's
market power.' 3 2
Between 1987 and 1991, the FTC and DOJ investigated only
twenty-seven of 229 hospital mergers, and challenged only five.133
As a result, antitrust challenges have barred relatively few hospital
127. The FTC/DOJ joint Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in the Health Care Area
set forth criteria for analyzing such ventures and require that participants in the venture share
substantial financial risks. Health Care Industry Policies, supra note 77, at 20,759-60. It does not
create a safety zone for discounted or other fee-for-service arrangements, nor does it provide a
safety zone for ventures involving equity investments by physicians. According to an earlier FTC
policy statement, the coordination or joining of such functions as production, management, promo-
tion, distribution, financing, and debt collection supported a finding of integration. Physician
Agreements to Control Medical Prepayment Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,982, 48,987 (1981).
128. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1988)) (addressing the acquisition of stock of one corporation by another).
129. Horizontal Merger Guidelines - 1993, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T 13,406, at 21,193
(April 13, 1993) [hereinafter Horizontal Merger Guidelines].
130. Id.
131. FTC Chairman Janet Steiger recently elaborated on the FTC's analysis of proposed hospi-
tal mergers:
A variety of other factors, including the experience of health care insurers and other
buyers of hospital services (such as health care plans and large employers) and the
transaction's effect on competition, influence the Commission's decisions as to whether
to challenge a merger of hospitals. In analyzing likely competitive effects, the Com-
mission considers the timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency of new entry; the ability of
smaller firms to expand services; the likelihood that the merged firm can exercise
unilateral market power or act collusively with the other remaining firms in the mar-
ket; and efficiencies that can be achieved only by the proposed merger.
Senate Hearings - Hospital Mergers, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 268, at 3 (June 23, 1993).
132. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 129, at 21,194-195.
133. Hearings, supra note 11l, at 27 n.23 (prepared statement of Janet D. Steiger, FTC Chair-
man). Between 1981 and 1992, the FTC investigated twenty-seven hospital mergers and issued
complaints in only five. FTC Reports Issuance of Complaints in 20% of § 7 Investigations of
Hospitals, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1629, at 289-90 (Aug. 26, 1993)
[hereinafter Investigations of Hospitals].
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mergers."" The recent FTC/DOJ joint Antitrust Enforcement Pol-
icy Statements in the Health Care Area create "safety zones" for
mergers of small hospitals and provide for formation of physician
networks that include 20 percent or less of the physicians in each
specialty in the relevant geographic market. 3 5
4. Joint Ventures
Alternatively, providers may partially integrate for some pur-
poses, such as contracting with AHPs, while maintaining separate,
competing practices. In partial integrations, competitors form a joint
venture to share the risk of economic gain or loss.186 Hospitals, for
instance, can share services - such as laundry and data processing
- in which they do not compete. 3 7
Most joint ventures will be analyzed under the rule of reason.'
Partial integrations that offer new services not previously offered by
the participants independently are treated leniently under the anti-
trust laws. 39 This is particularly helpful in the health care field,
where new technology may be too expensive for any provider to
purchase alone.""0 Restrictions on competition that are reasonably
ancillary to an integrated joint venture are likely to be upheld. " " As
discussed above, where parties to a joint venture do not share eco-
nomic risk, for example, where the joint venture is not integrated,
134. Investigations of Hospitals, supra note 133, at 289-90.
135. Health Care Industry Policies, supra note 77, at 20,755. The AMA has stated that the
"safety zone" is "too narrow and does not reflect the needs of the market." Letter From Kirk B.
Johnson, AMA, to Anne K. Bingaman and Janet D. Steiger 1 (Oct. 6, 1993) (on file with author).
136. Doctor-Hospital Ventures Can't Fix Reimbursement Levels, [Jan.-June] Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1508, at 419 (Mar. 21, 1991) (stating that a joint venture allows
physicians or hospitals to share risks of adverse financial results).
137. Horoschak, supra note 98, at 2.
138. See Physician Agreements to Control Medical Prepayment Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,982
(1981) (describing the FTC's decision to proceed on a case-by-case basis in evaluating physician
agreements regarding prepayment plans).
139. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984) (noting that although joint
ventures have no immunity from the antitrust laws, a joint selling agreement may make possible a
new product by reaping otherwise unattainable efficiencies); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1979) (subjecting the issuance of blanket licenses to a
rule of reason analysis, rather than declaring it per se unlawful price-fixing).
140. The FTC/DOJ Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in the Health Care Area provide
a "safety zone" for such joint ventures, provided that no hospital could afford to purchase the
equipment separately and that the venture includes no more than the number of hospitals whose
participation is needed to support the equipment. Health Care Industry Policies, supra note 77, at
20,758.
141. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(finding that restraints ancillary to a joint venture did not violate § I of the Sherman Act).
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price or market allocation decisions will violate the antitrust laws.1""
Antitrust enforcement agencies are also concerned about partial
integrations because the collaboration may result in "spillover" into
areas in which the venture participants compete. "' For example,
several hospitals in a community can form a legitimate joint venture
for the purpose of operating a Magnetic Resonance Imaging
("MRI")'" clinic. The successful operation of this venture requires
that the participants meet and discuss issues related to the venture.
The hospital participants may, however, use these meetings to col-
lude on aspects of services unrelated to the operation of the venture,
such as which hospital will provide pediatric services and which will
provide orthopedic services. 45 As a result, many joint venture agree-
ments include safeguards to prevent spillover collusion.'" An inte-
gration can also come under close scrutiny if it possesses market
power, such as where a large proportion of area competitors partici-
pate in one venture.147 If certain key competitors are represented in
a joint venture, there are risks of price increases because the joint
venture is the only means through which a buyer can obtain the
services. Problems may also arise when physicians start a joint yen-
142. See Palmer v. BRG, 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (finding that horizontal market allocation
among actual or potential competitors is per se illegal); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 345 (1982) (finding that price agreements among nonintegrated competitors
are per se illegal); State v. Wenatchee Valley Clinic, 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 68,118, at
58,780 (E.D. Wash. 1988) (prohibiting a medical clinic from fixing prices). Partial integrations
may also negotiate nonprice terms of a contract with third parties, but they may only serve as
messengers to individual joint venturers for the price terms. United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d
1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 1992). Partial integrations should avoid the appearance of tie-in restraints if
they may also have market power. See Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp.
Dist., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,499, at 66,125 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding a hospital liable for
its refusal to allow HMOs to contract for perinatal services at the hospital unless they also agreed
to use the hospital for nonperinatal services).
143. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 3.4 (1988); see also Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971,
981 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding that various agreements between two competitors did not serve a
legitimate purpose of a joint venture).
144. Health Care Industry Policies, supra note 77, at 20,758-59 (stating that this arrangement
would usually fall within the antitrust safety zone).
145. See Horoschak, supra note 98, at 8 (stating that a "venture" in which hospital A provides
one service and hospital B provides another does nothing more than restrain competition).
146. For cases imposing conditions to minimize the risk of spillover, see United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619 (W.D. Ky. 1985); General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374
(1984).
147. Blue Cross of Wash. & Alaska v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
T 64,590, at 73,211 (W.D. Wash. 1981); Medical Serv. Corp., 88 F.T.C. 906, 908-09 (1976); see
also supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text (describing the application of the Clayton Act to
hospital or physician mergers).
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ture to operate an oxygen supply business with enough referral
power to monopolize the business and exclude competing oxygen
suppliers. 48 Similarly, joint ventures by hospitals and durable medi-
cal equipment ("DME") providers have been challenged because
the hospitals had unique access to patients, or coerced patients to
use the DME partner." 9
5. Concerns for the Future
When considering health care reform, attention must be paid to
the delicate balance between efficient integrations which can benefit
consumers and anticompetitive concentrations of market power.'
Rather than increase direct regulation, an efficient market-oriented
health care system would encourage horizontal integrations that cre-
ate efficiencies, but would prevent integrations that produce market
power.15' Hospital merger enforcement by the DOJ and FTC is
designed to achieve this objective. 52 The federal antitrust agencies
have attempted to ensure that more than one hospital is available in
a geographic area to guarantee choices for consumers and payors
and competition on price and quality. 5 3 In some ways, hospital
merger enforcement has preserved the possibility that multiple
AHPs, each anchored by a separate hospital, can be formed to com-
pete in each geographic area.
148. The FTC recently challenged such ventures. First Cases Emerge from FTC Examination
of Doctor Referrals to Self-Owned Firms, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1638, at 579-80 (Nov. 4, 1993).
149. In three recent decisions, courts concluded that the hospital at issue had market power in
the inpatient acute care market and had demonstrated an intent to impair competition in the
downstream DME market. See Key Enters. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550, 1560
(11 th Cir. 1990); Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139,
150 (4th Cir. 1990); M & M Medical Supplies & Serv., Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp., Inc., 1991-
2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,618, at 66,760 (4th Cir. 1981). All three cases involved extraordinary
efforts by hospitals to steer patients to affiliated DME suppliers. Id.
150. See Former Division Official Discusses Antitrust Impact Under Clinton Plan, [July-Dec.]
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1639, at 630 (Nov. 11, 1993) (stating that legitimate
joint ventures will be lawful unless they exercise excessive market power or engage in anticompeti-
tive exclusionary conduct).
151. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (stating that
while integration can produce efficiencies, it can also create market power).
152. Hearings, supra note 111, at 28 (prepared statement of Janet D. Steiger, FTC Chairman)
(noting that the FTC seeks to ensure that health care consumers have a sufficient selection of
competing providers, and describing the different factors that hospital merger investigations con-
sider so as to allow those that create efficiencies).
153. See id. at 26-28 (stating that the majority of hospital mergers do not endanger competi-
tion because they occur in markets with a substantial number of competitors) (prepared statement
of Janet D. Steiger, FTC Chairman).
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There is no magic number of AHPs that must be available to
compete with one another.' Some major metropolitan areas may
enjoy competition between five or even ten AHPs. But some cities
may only have enough hospitals to support two or three competing
AHPs. 155 Finally, in some rural areas there may be only one hospi-
tal, which would mean that there could be only one AHP in that
area, unless the hospital participates in multiple AHPs. 151
Antitrust enforcement after health care reform should focus on
ensuring active competition among providers. 57 The extent of that
competition will vary by geographic area. " The antitrust agencies
should attempt to maximize the competitive options available to
consumers. Health care reform may also encourage the formation of
other groups to counterbalance concentrations of market power. For
instance, if several doctors merge their practices, their market power
could be constrained by the buying power of the AHP that pays for
their services. 59 Similarly, the power of a large AHP could be coun-
terbalanced by the buying power of a Health Alliance. 160 This coun-
terbalancing requires careful planning and the establishment of suf-
ficient channels for individuals to express their choices about health
care options, either politically or through their choice of a purchas-
ing organization. Purchasing entities must also be able to choose
among providers and to pick those that give quality care at a rea-
sonable price.' 61
154. See Richard Kranick et al., The Marketplace in Health Care Reform: The Demographic
Limitations of Managed Competition, 328 N~w ENG. J. MED. 148, 149 (1993) (noting that the
minimal number of plans needed to avoid a market with strong oligopolistic tendencies is not
clear).
155. Id. at 150-51.
156. A recent report in the New England Journal of Medicine concluded that only 42 percent
of the population lives in market areas capable of supporting three fully-integrated provider net-
works, while 29 percent of the population lives in thinly populated market areas that cannot sup-
port more than one integrated provider network. Id.
157. See supra notes 16-34 and accompanying text (discussing how the lack of competition has
led to the failure of today's health care system).
158. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (discussing the various bills' plans for the
number of Health Alliances and corporate alliances in any given geographic area).
159. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing how AHPs would manage the deliv-
ery of health care services, by contracting with providers, conducting utilization review, and assur-
ing quality).
160. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing Health Alliances and how they
will purchase a basic package of health care benefits from competing providers).
161. See supra note 16-34 and accompanying text (discussing how a lack of competition has
led to the failure of today's health care system).
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6. Vertical Integration
Vertical integration after health care reform is likely to include
integration among physicians, hospitals, and other providers, as well
as integration between providers and payors.'6 2 Because vertical in-
tegration does not involve competitors, it typically raises fewer anti-
trust concerns than horizontal integration among competitors.8 3
Nonetheless, vertical integration does involve some antitrust issues.
For example, vertical integrations between hospitals and providers
or between providers and payors may pose antitrust problems if they
foreclose access to a market.' This foreclosure could occur when
one hospital possesses a high percentage of area physicians, making
it difficult for other hospitals to compete for patients. Furthermore,
if a hospital has exclusive contracts with a large percentage of phy-
sicians of a certain specialty, another hospital may be foreclosed
from offering that specialty. If a major health insurer creates an
integrated health care delivery system by contracting exclusively
with one hospital in a community, other hospitals in that community
are foreclosed from the subscribers of that insurer and other payors
would be foreclosed from contracting with that hospital.
Typically, joint venture agreements contain ancillary vertical re-
straints on economic variables such as price, output, territories, cus-
tomers, and access to the joint venture.' 6 5 Many joint venture cases
involve challenges to ancillary restraints, which must be analyzed to
determine whether they will have any anticompetitive effects.' 6
A restraint common to vertically-integrated ventures requires that
the venture deal exclusively with the venture partners for certain
goods or services, or that the venture partners deal exclusively with
162. ABA WORKING GROUP, supra note 30, at 8, 12-13.
163. Id.; see also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 99 (3d ed.
1992) (stating that vertical arrangements are typically permissible under the antitrust laws).
164. See Horoschak, supra note 98, at 23-24 (describing how the participation of a sufficiently
high proportion of area physicians may create market power with respect to the provision of
service).
165. E.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 297 (1985); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99, 103 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
166. In general, vertical nonprice restraints such as exclusive distributorships, territorial
clauses, and location clauses are analyzed under the rule of reason. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp.
v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988) (holding that vertical nonprice restraints are not
per se illegal); Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) (holding that the per
se rule does not apply to vertical restrictions).
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the venture for certain services."' For example, a joint venture
agreement among several hospitals for the purpose of operating an
MRI might require the hospitals to use the venture MRI to the ex-
clusion of other MRIs. These types of agreements are referred to as
exclusive dealing arrangements. 168  Vertically-integrated ventures
may also limit access to the venture. For example, a Preferred Pro-
vider Organization ("PPO")I 69 created by an insurer may require
that its subscribers utilize only PPO physicians or may require
higher co-payment for non-PPO physicians, thereby effectively fore-
closing non-PPO physicians from treating PPO subscribers.1 70 This
type of an exclusivity provision may give rise to claims that the ven-
ture is a vertical concerted refusal to deal.
Exclusive dealing arrangements can take two forms: (1) agree-
ments requiring a buyer to purchase products or supplies for a sig-
nificant period of time from only one supplier; or (2) agreements
forbidding a buyer from purchasing from the supplier's competi-
tors.171 The potential pro-competitive effects of exclusive dealing ar-
rangements are well recognized:
In the case of the buyer, they may assure supply, afford protection against
rises in price, [and] enable long-term planning on the basis of known costs
.... From the seller's point of view, requirements contracts may make
possible the substantial reduction of selling expenses, give protection against
price fluctuations, and . . . offer the possibility of a predictable market.'
167. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295 (describing vertical restrictions
in the form of exclusive dealing agreements as widespread); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, EcONOMICS
AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 241 (1985) (defining an exclusive dealing agreement as a contract
under which a buyer promises to buy its requirements of one or more products exclusively from a
particular seller).
168. HOVENKAMP. supra note 167, at 241.
169. Preferred Provider Organizations are arrangements under which a group of health care
providers contracts directly or through a broker with a third-party payor to provide designated
services to a defined population. Josephine Gittle, Hospital Cost Containment in Iowa: A Guide
for State Public Policymakers, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1263, 1272 (1984).
170. The courts, the FTC, and the DOJ recognize that, assuming sufficient market alternatives
are available, such restrictions can encourage efficiency and will likely be pro-competitive by con-
trolling costs. See Letter from Michael 0. Wise, Acting Director, FTC, to Joseph P. Mazurek,
Attorney General of the State of Montana 4 (Feb. 4, 1993) (on file with author) (discussing
programs that limit the number of providers who participate in their programs and their popular
success); see also U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 592 (1st Cir. 1993)
(discussing an exclusivity provision in a doctor-HMO agreement where the physician agreed not
to serve as a participating physician for any other HMO plan); Barry v. Blue Cross of Cal., 1986-
2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,367, at 61,953 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting the existence of certain pro-
competitive elements in vertical agreements between Blue Cross and the doctors); James, supra
note 16, at 10 (discussing an example of an exclusive dealing agreement).
171. HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, at 241.
172. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-7 (1949).
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In 1949, the Supreme Court enunciated the "quantitative sub-
stantiality" rule for determining whether an exclusive dealing ar-
rangement is an unreasonable restraint of trade.173 This rule mea-
sures the foreclosure of competition by focusing solely on the
percentage of the relevant market impacted by the arrangement. 7
Later, in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,' 75 the Supreme
Court adopted a rule that has been characterized as the "qualitative
substantiality" test.' 76 Instead of focusing exclusively on the per-
centage of the market that has been foreclosed, the Court also con-
siders other factors, such as barriers to entry and the probable im-
mediate and future effects of the arrangement on competition. 77
Exclusive dealing arrangements, therefore, are subject to a rule of
reason analysis, with special emphasis on the nature, extent, and du-
ration of market foreclosure. 78 As with all rule of reason analyses,
the anticompetitive effects of the arrangement are weighed against
173. Id. at 314.
174. Id.; see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323-24 (1962) (holding that
an important consideration in the evaluation of vertical arrangements is the market share fore-
closed to the competitors of either party). The Standard Oil Court emphasized that other compet-
itors in the market also used exclusive dealing arrangements and considered the collective effects
of the multiple exclusive arrangements. Standard Oil Co., 337 U.S. at 314.
175. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
176. Id. at 331-32.
177. Id. at 328, 334-35; see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29
(1984) (stating that in proving a violation of the Sherman Act, one must consider the actual effect
on competition).
178. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 594 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating
that a common danger of exclusivity agreements is that they may foreclose so much of the availa-
ble supply that existing competitors or new entrants are limited in a number of ways). Both the
DOJ and the FTC consider the extent to which a market is foreclosed by provider ventures. See J.
Paul McGrath, 60 Minutes With J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney, General Antitrust Divi-
sion, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 131, 132 (1985) (stating that PPOs should not raise antitrust issues if
they are not too all-inclusive in membership and are not anticompetitive); Horoschak, supra note
98, at 20 (noting that exclusivity arrangements that have obtained a large percentage of area
physicians are likely to endanger competition by foreclosing market entry); James F. Rill, Re-
marks Before the National Health Lawyers Association 8-9 (Feb. 15, 1991) (transcript on file
with author) (noting that the DOJ looks skeptically on the formation of a PPO among a large
percentage of the providers in a community); Rule, supra note 98, at 13 (stating that a PPO
containing all or most of the providers in a market can serve as a powerful vehicle for a protec-
tionist boycott); see also State v. Greater Cleveland Hosp. Ass'n, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
11 65,685, at 69,500, 69,501 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (enjoining a hospital from entering into any agree-
ment which restrained competition among prepayment plans); Letter from Arthur M. Lerner,
Assistant Director, FTC, to Gilbert Frimet (March 22, 1984) (on file with author) (informing an
HMO that imposing an exclusivity requirement on their participating physicians, who accounted
for 60 percent of the market, would raise concern since it could make it extremely difficult for a
new or existing HMO to operate effectively).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
the procompetitive effects.179
Similarly, vertical "concerted refusal to deal" claims are usually
analyzed under the rule of reason 8 ' and require that the plaintiff
establish the existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy,
and the existence of an unreasonable restraint of trade resulting
from the refusal to deal. 8' To determine whether the restraint is
unreasonable, a court balances the anticompetitive effects of the
provision against its pro-competitive effects.' 82 There may be little
or no adverse effect on competition if alternative sources of supply
are available. Put another way, if the portion of the market fore-
closed to the excluded entity is small, it is more likely that the re-
straint will be found to be reasonable. Thus, the analysis of a con-
certed refusal to deal claim is similar to the analysis of an exclusive
dealing claim - the anticompetitive effect of the market foreclosure
is then balanced against the procompetitive effects.
After health care reform, antitrust enforcement involving vertical
integration should continue to focus on insuring that multiple
choices are available to both consumers and purchasers of health
care, like AHPs or Health Alliances. As a practical matter, there is
likely to be little difference in how the antitrust laws are applied in
this area after health care reform takes place.
D. Antitrust Exemptions
There are certain situations in which the antitrust laws do not
apply to anticompetitive practices. Several of these antitrust exemp-
tions are potentially applicable to health care reform. Additional ex-
emptions have been proposed by health care providers, including the
American Medical Association,' 83 the American Hospital Associa-
179. U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 595 (stating that under the rule of reason, procompetitive
effects of exclusive dealing can outweigh the anticompetitive effects of restraint).
180. Vertical refusals to deal designed to enforce resale price maintenance or tying arrange-
ments have been held to be per se illegal. E.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485
U.S. 717, 724 (1988).
181. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760-61 (1984) (explaining the
requirements for the existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy, and discussing unreason-
able restraints and their origins).
182. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
183. See Hearings, supra note 11, at 93-94 (prepared statement of Dr. Richard F. Corlin, on
behalf of the AMA) (requesting a statutory scheme permitting health care providers to join to-
gether to collectively negotiate with third-party payors with respect to the operation of a managed
care plan).
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tion, 84 and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.1" As
noted above, the Clinton Administration's plan also creates an anti-
trust exemption.186 This section discusses each of these exceptions in
detail.
1. State Action Doctrine
In Parker v. Brown, 87 the Supreme Court held that when a state
requires or regulates a practice, principles of federalism prevent fed-
eral laws from overriding these state laws.' 88 Several recent Su-
preme Court cases have further refined the "state action
doctrine."' 89
Under the state action doctrine, a state must clearly articulate an
affirmative policy to allow private parties to act anticompetitively. 90
In addition, the state must actively supervise the anticompetitive ac-
tivity of the private parties.' 9' It must substitute an "adequate sys-
tem of regulation" and exercise "significant control" over the an-
ticompetitive behavior. 192 Active supervision includes a review on
184. See id. at 95 (stressing the need for greater collaboration amongst hospitals and asking for
change in the current governmental antitrust policy in order to facilitate cooperative action).
185. See Letter from John R. Ferguson, Counsel to Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Ass'n, to
John W. Clark, Acting Attorney General, Antitrust Division 2-3 (March 12, 1993) (on file with
author) (proposing a self-imposed limitation that restricts member companies' upward pricing
freedom to annual increases in the Consumer Price Index).
186. See H.R. 3600, § 1322 (c) (establishing an antitrust exemption for collective fee negotia-
tions by physicians and hospitals). In contrast, House Bill 3222 creates no explicit antitrust ex-
emptions. Instead, it requires that the federal government develop guidelines on the application of
the antitrust laws to AHPs and promptly. issue business review letters to AHPs. H.R. 3222,
§ 1231. House Bill 3222 also creates potential exemptions for collective action through certificates
of public advantage from the Attorney General based on a weighing of the benefits of the venture
against its anticompetitive effects. Id. § 1232. The certificate must be issued or denied in 30 days.
Id. Senate Bill 1770 would establish "safe harbors" that largely parallel the DOJ and FTC ex-
emptions. S. 1770, §§ 4202-08; Health Care Industry Policies, supra note 77, at 20,755.
187. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
188. Id. at 362.
189. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2177-80 (1992) (holding that actual
state supervision of a practice is a precondition for the application of the state action doctrine);
Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 99-106 (1988) (holding that the state action doctrine does not
protect physicians from federal antitrust liability for their activities on hospital peer review com-
mittees); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 55-66
(1985) (holding that collective rate-making activities, although not compelled by the state, were
immune from federal antitrust liability under the state action doctrine); California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102-106 (1980) (holding that a state must
actively supervise a practice in order to establish antitrust immunity).
190. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 65.
191. Patrick. 486 U.S. 100-101; Town of Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46-47 (1985);
California Retail Liquor Dealers, 445 U.S. at 105.
192. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345 n.7 (1987).
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the merits of a decision, not just on the procedures.19 s The Supreme
Court held in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.'94 that state action
immunity is "disfavored" and that the state must in fact exercise its
authority to supervise. 198 Staffing and funding an inactive state reg-
ulatory board is not sufficient.' 96 Negative option schemes must
show that state officials in fact took the necessary steps to supervise
any price-fixing schemes. 97
The Clinton Administration's plan expands the state action doc-
trine. Section 1322(c) authorizes states to allow physicians and
other providers to negotiate collectively on fees and other terms and
conditions if the state "actively supervises" their conduct.' 98 Thus,
the Clinton Administration's bill creates a federal statute explicitly
allowing application of the judicially-created state action doctrine.
The ostensible purpose of the Clinton Administration's proposed
antitrust exemption is to counterbalance the possible market power
of Health Alliances. 9 9 However, this rationale makes little sense.
Providers are expected to contract with AHPs, who in turn will con-
tract with the Health Alliance.2 °0 Because there will likely be multi-
ple AHPs in each area, an AHP is unlikely to have market power.
Providers will have multiple AHPs from which to choose to con-
tract, and there should be no need to counterbalance the market
power of AHPs. Moreover, as discussed above, other market-based
alternatives, such as multiple competing Health Alliances, are a
preferable way to achieve this result.2 10'
In recent years, at least fifteen states enacted legislation to pro-
vide antitrust immunity to certain collaborative agreements among
health care providers. 202 As a result, the state action doctrine may
193. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105.
194. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S.Ct. 2169, 2178 (1992).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2179.
197. Id.
198. H.R. 3600, § 1322(c).
199. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (discussing the market power of health
alliances).
200. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (describing AHP's).
201. See supra note 108-09 and accompanying text (discussing the Administration's plan to
counter the market power of health alliances).
202. See Sarah Vance, Immunity for State Sanctioned Provider Collaboration After Ticor, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 409 (1993) (describing the immunity provisions in Maine, Wisconsin, Minnesota,
Ohio, Washington, and Kansas); see also, e.g,, COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-32-2701 to 2715
(West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 408.0015-.604 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); 1993 Iowa
Legis. Serv. 158 (West); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4929 (1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
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be an obstacle to effective health care reform by precluding the ap-
plication of federal antitrust laws. The federal government should
consider the dynamics of competition and antitrust enforcement
when it structures its health care reform proposals. The state action
doctrine could distort the market forces that are likely to be the
basis for health care reform. Moreover, allowing states to exempt
portions of the health care industry from federal antitrust oversight
could lead to unequal health services according to an individual
state's regulatory scheme." 3
The federal government is best situated for a global evaluation of
nationwide conditions and best able to compensate for possible mar-
ket distortion on a systemic basis. This global, systemic perspective
is necessary to achieve a coherent approach to health care issues.
The federal government, therefore, should consider preempting state
laws that purport to regulate health care and provide antitrust ex-
emptions.20 Preemption is likely to be necessary to protect competi-
tive forces that have been built into the reform plan and that are
crucial to its success. Preemption also will ensure that health care
regulation is as nearly uniform as possible throughout the
country. 5
2. McCarran-Ferguson Act
The McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the "business of insur-
ance" from the reach of the antitrust laws if a state regulates that
industry.206 Excluded from the exemption are agreements to boy-
cott, coerce, or intimidate as well as acts of boycotting, coercion, or
§ 405-D (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62J.29, 62J.2913 (West 1992); 1993 Mont. Laws
606; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2950 (Consol. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131E-192.3 (1993);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3727.24 (Baldwin 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-11-1301 to -1309
(1993); 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 638 (Vernon); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 39.34, 70.44 (1993); Wis.
STAT. § 609.001 (1993).
203. See supra notes 71-89 and accompanying text (discussing examples of how federal anti-
trust law has promoted competition and equality in health care services).
204. There is a presumption that state regulation of health matters is primarily a matter of
local concern. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714 (1985).
Congress, however, may render state action in a particular area invalid if it decides that the
interest of the federal government in that area is of national interest. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 399, 404 (1990); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST FEDERALISM: THE ROLE OF STATE
LAW 11-15 (1988).
205. The power of preemption ensures that a state may not pass a law that is inconsistent with
federal law. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 128 (1913).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988).
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intimidation. 0 7
If the federal government decides to regulate health insurance,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act should be repealed to allow competi-
tion in all areas affected by health care reform. Repeal of the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson exemption as it applies to health care insurance
would require Health Alliances and AHPs to operate procompeti-
tively. The Administration's bill proposes repeal of the McCarran-
Ferguson exemption.20 8 Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH),
Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies
and Business Rights,2"9 and Anne Bingaman, Assistant Attorney
General for the Antitrust Division, also support repeal of the
exemption.210
3. Proposed Exemptions For Health Care Providers
Physicians, hospitals, and pharmaceutical manufacturers have
proposed various antitrust law exemptions or "clarifications" that
would effectively exempt certain conduct from federal antitrust
laws.211 However, not a single proponent of these proposed exemp-
tions has been able to establish an adequate rationale supporting
their existence. Since competition is the essential foundation of most
health care reform proposals,21 2 antitrust exemptions for health care
providers should not be enacted because they permit providers to
avoid competition.
207. Id. § 1013(b). See generally Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2916
(1993) (discussing examples of what does and does not constitute a boycott); Union Labor Life
Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126-34 (1982) (describing the relevant criteria for determining
whether a particular practice is part of the "business of insurance" exempted by the McCarran-
Ferguson Act); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1979) (hold-
ing that § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the business of insurance, not the busi-
ness of insurers); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541-46 (1978) (holding
that § 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is broad and unqualified, covering any act or agree-
ment amounting to a boycott, coercion, or intimidation); SEC v. National Secur., Inc., 393 U.S.
453, 463 (1969) (holding that fraudulent misrepresentation in the "business of insurance" is not
enough to exclude a company from the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption).
208. H.R. 3600, § 5501.
209. Antitrust Issues in the Health Care Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Medi-
care and Long-Term Care of the Senate.Comm. on Finance. 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1993)
(statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
210. Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1993: Hearing on H.R. 9 Before the Subcomm. on
Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 15-
16 (1993) (statement of Anne Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division).
211. See supra notes 112-50 and accompanying text (discussing exemptions and clarifications
proposed by the various groups).
212. See supra notes 16-34 and accompanying text (explaining the need for competition).
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The AMA has proposed an antitrust law "clarification" to "as-
sure that physicians can fulfill the role expected of them in the re-
form process." 13 According to the AMA, in order for physicians to
respond to managed competition, they must be able to negotiate col-
lectively with managed care plans without the threat of civil or
criminal antitrust actions."' 4 By "clarifying" the law as requested by
the AMA, Congress would be granting the AMA an exemption and,
in essence, allowing physicians to bargain collectively with managed
care plans without a concomitant enhancement of efficiency. 15 As a
result, price competition among physicians would be eliminated and
consumers would face a greater risk of price increases or restrictions
on choice.21 6 In fact, the AMA proposal would exempt the precise
conduct the Justice Department prosecuted in United States v.
Alston.2"
Similarly, the American Hospital Association ("AHA") claims
that competition has led to a "medical arms race" of costly duplica-
tion of services and facilities.21 It has proposed legislation that
would exempt certain collective or cooperative actions by hospitals
from the application of antitrust laws.1 9 Hospitals, the AHA ar-
gues, have been discouraged from forming advantageous mergers or
joint ventures by fear of antitrust prosecution.22 0 Further, the AHA
213. Hearings, supra note 11l, at 93-94 (prepared statement of Dr. Richard F. Corlin, on
behalf of the AMA); see also AMA, POSITION ON ANTITRUST 2 (1993) (on file with author)
[hereinafter AMA POSITION]; Edward Felsenthal, Doctors Seek Right to Join Forces to Negoti-
ate with Health Plans, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1994, at A12. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and
Cong. William Archer (R-Tex.) have introduced legislation to permit collective fee negotiations
by physicians with less than 20 percent of the market. S. 1658, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
214. AMA POSITION, supra note 213, at 2. The AMA has also requested an FTC Staff Advi-
sory Opinion to permit the group to engage in professional peer review of physician fees. Id.
215. The AMA believes that physicians participating in managed care plans should have an
opportunity for input into the plans about their policies. Id. The AMA contends that these physi-
cians should have input in two ways. First, committees elected by participating physicians should
be created to address medical review and quality assurance criteria. Second, participating physi-
cians should be allowed to develop and present joint presentations to the health plan, provided that
they do not threaten or implement a boycott. Id.
216.' The DOJ and the FTC support this theory and have opposed physician input in managed
care plans because of fears of possible price-fixing. Id. In recent Congressional testimony, the FTC
opposed the exemption proposed by the AMA. Antitrust Law Enforcement and Health Care Mar-
kets: Hearings Before the Sen. Finance Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-16 (1994) (prepared
statement of Mary Lou Steptoe, Acting Director of the Bureau of Competition of the FTC).
217. 974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992); see also supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing
the Alston case).
218. Hearings, supra note 11l, at 79 (prepared statement of Fredric J. Enter, on behalf of the
AHA).
219. Id. at 79-81.
220. Id. at 83-84.
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claims that the antitrust laws are contrary to efforts to cut costs by
consolidating facilities and services and eliminating duplication.22'
These arguments exaggerate the effects of antitrust enforcement
actions in hospital mergers.222 In the past decade, the FTC and DOJ
have challenged less than one hospital merger per year from among
fifty to one hundred mergers in a typical year.223 In addition, neither
agency has challenged a single joint venture.2 Competition among
health care providers is critical to the success of health care re-
form.223 Mergers and other joint actions by hospitals should con-
tinue to be subject to antitrust review. 2 6 The antitrust agencies
should evaluate whether, after a proposed merger or joint venture,
competition among hospitals will be sufficient to support multiple,
competing AHPs. If so, the merger should be allowed. If not, it
should be challenged.
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association ("PMA") has
also sought an antitrust law "clarification. 227 In March 1993, the
PMA submitted a request for a business review letter from the DOJ
exempting PMA members from prosecution for certain price agree-
ments.228 Specifically, the PMA sought to "set out a pricing policy
by which the member companies, acting individually and unilater-
ally, would agree to be bound. ' 22 9 Each PMA member would "limit
its price increases, if any, on the entire line of its prescription drug
products in any calendar year to an amount not to exceed the in-
crease in the CPI. ' '2s0 In October 1993, Anne Bingaman advised the
group that the DOJ would challenge the PMA's proposed coordi-
221. Id. at 79.
222. The recent FTC/DOJ Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in the Health Care Area
create an extremely narrow "safe harbor" for hospital mergers involving hospitals with fewer than
100 beds and an average daily census of forty or fewer patients. Health Care Industry Policies,
supra note 77, at 20,755.
223. Hearings, supra note 111, at 27 n.23 (prepared statement of Janet D. Steiger, FTC Chair-
man). During the period 1987-91, there were 229 hospital mergers, only twenty-seven of which
were investigated by the FTC or DOJ, and only five of which were challenged. Id.
224. Id. at 27-28.
225. See supra notes 16-34 and accompanying text (explaining the need for competition in
health care reform).
226. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text (discussing hospital mergers).
227. Letter from John R. Ferguson, Counsel for the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Associa-
tion, to John W. Clark, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division 2 (March 12,
1993) (on file with author).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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nated price cap.' s'
There are several problems with the PMA's proposal. First, it is
surprisingly similar to the maximum fee schedule condemned by the
Supreme Court in Maricopa 32 where the Court rejected claims
that a maximum fee schedule was procompetitive and pointed out
that maximum price schemes tend to "acquire all the attributes of
an arrangement fixing minimum prices. ' 23 3 Moreover, the PMA
proposal could eliminate price competition between drug manufac-
turers, resulting in increased drug prices. In fact, such a fee agree-
ment would threaten the aggressive price competition recently ex-
perienced by the pharmaceutical industry. 3 Finally, it is difficult to
understand why unilateral action by pharmaceutical firms could not
achieve the PMA's desired effects. 35
CONCLUSION
Even if Congress never enacts a health care reform proposal, the
Clinton Administration has already achieved many of its objectives
by stimulating debate on the issue and forcing everyone to focus on
the problems in our current health care system. The market is al-
ready responding to this focus and changing in anticipation of re-
form. 6 Providers and payors are restructuring to position them-
selves for a post-reform world.2 37 Hospital pre-merger filings with
the FTC and DOJ in fiscal year 1993 were twice the number filed in
1992.238 Recent articles in many publications have described efforts
by health care providers to position themselves for a post-reform
231. Antitrust Division Would Challenge Drug Association Plan to Control Prices. [July-Dec.]
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 1634, at 462 (Oct. 7, 1993).
232. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
233. Id. at 347.
234. See Elyse Tanouye, Drug Prices Get Dose Market Pressure, WALL ST. J., March 11,
1993, at 1I (stating that "[fOor the first time in years, competition among drug makers is prompt-
ing some companies to try an aggressive marketing approach: lowering prices").
235. Indeed, several pharmaceutical firms have announced unilateral pricing plans that impose
limits on future price increases. See Michael Waldholz, Merck Releases Its Proposal on Linking
Annual Price Boosts to Inflation Rate. WALL ST. J., April 19, 1993, at B8 (describing Merck's
proposal calling for drug companies to sign contracts that tie annual price rises to the inflation
rate, thereby reducing prescription drug spending by nearly $7 billion over three years).
236. Jolie Solomon et al., Why Wait for Hillary, NEWSWEEK, June 28, at 38-40.
237. Id.
238. George Anders, Mergers of Hospitals Surge Amid Pressures to Cut Costs, WALL ST. J.
Dec. 1, 1993, at BI, B8; see also Sandy Lutz, Mergers: Two-Hospital Towns Try Togetherness,
MODERN HEALTHCARE. Dec. 6, 1993, at 39 (discussing how mergers are sometimes necessary to
remain competitive).
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world." 9 Some commentators have noted that competition in health
care had already started a health care revolution in advance of the
Administration's reform proposals. 4 0 Hospitals and physicians are
proposing mergers, joint ventures, and integrations that are chang-
ing the face of health care.241 For example, in Minneapolis, large
employers have formed a coalition to control costs while increasing
the quality of care by stimulating competition between providers,
requiring consumers to manage their own consumption of health
care, forcing providers to engage in quality improvement programs,
and minimizing administrative costs.242
Not all ventures that have been proposed will be accomplished,
and not all will be successful. However, these changes are likely to
produce some of the benefits the Administration hopes to achieve
and to lead to increased support for health care reform. Competition
and the antitrust laws should and are playing critical roles in this
revolution in health care.
239. See, e.g., Anders & Winslow, supra note 3, at Al (describing how the health care indus-
try is preparing for change with increased mergers and the restructuring of large hospitals in
order to become more efficient); Della de Lafuente, Doctors' Orders: Integrate, MODERN HEALTH-
CARE, May 3, 1993, at 25-32 (describing various integration techniques which different health
care groups are implementing in order to become more efficient and cost-effective); Solomon et al.,
supra note 236, at 38-40 (describing recent transformations in the health care industry, such as
more consolidation, increased mergers, and the expansion of HMOs); Michael Waldholz, Merck
to Purchase Medco In $6 Billion Transaction, WALL ST. J.. July 29, 1993, at A3 (describing the
Merck purchase of Medco Containment Services, Inc. for $6 billion, which enabled it to become
the sole integrated producer and distributor of pharmaceuticals).
240. Solomon et al., supra note 236, at 39.
241. Id.
242. Antitrust Issues in the Health Care Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Medicare
and Long-Term Care of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103d. Cong., 1st Sess. 48-50 (1993) (tes-
timony of Steve Wetzell, Executive Director, Business Health Care Action Group).
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